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للإتصال
بنا

Politics Fiction Painting Poetry Press Critics T.Nazmi Elza

JPR 79

The book is by Noam Chomsky, Gilbert Achcar, and
Stephen Shalom.

Their
new book of edited dialogues came out some months ago but has
yet to receive much visible attention. Hopefully many users
will find the book useful.
Here we offer the ZNet book
interview, in which Shalom, the book's editor, answers
our usual author questions, and we also include an excerpt
from the book itself.
Perilous Power: The Middle East and
U.S. Foreign Policy
Dialogues on Terror, Democracy, War, and
Justice

By Noam Chomsky and Gilbert
Achcar.
Edited by Stephen R. Shalom.
Boulder, CO; Paradigm Publishers,
2006.

Interview
by Stephen R. Shalom

(1)
Can you tell ZNet, please, what your new book, Perilous Power,
is about? What is it trying to communicate?
Perilous Power
is a dialogue about U.S. policy in the Middle East between two of the most
astute analysts of this part of the world: Noam Chomsky and
Gilbert Achcar. Chomsky, of course, needs no introduction to
ZNet readers. This is his first totally new book devoted
exclusively to the Middle
East since The Fateful Triangle. Achcar, whose
writings on the Middle East have appeared often on ZNet, grew
up and lived for many years in Lebanon. He is the
author of, among other books, The Clash of Barbarisms and
Eastern Cauldron, and editor of The Israeli Dilemma.

In this new book, Chomsky and Achcar bring to bear a keen
understanding of the internal dynamics of the Middle East and
of the role of the United States, taking up all the key
questions, including such topics as terrorism, fundamentalism,
conspiracies, oil, democracy, self determination,
anti-Semitism, and anti-Arab racism, as well as the war in
Afghanistan, the invasion and occupation of Iraq, the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the sources of U.S. foreign
policy.
This current book is not two writers'
separate essays strung together. It is based on a dialogue
between them -- sometimes agreeing, sometimes complementing
one another's analysis based on their own perspectives and
information, and sometimes disagreeing -- and as such it
represents more than the sum of its parts. Through their
conversation, a richer understanding emerges from their shared
commitments and their varied expertise and experiences.
The
book aims to provide an introduction to U.S. policy in the Middle East for the general reader, but
it also has much that will be of interest to those with some
background on the region. Whether discussing the
Israel
lobby, the role of Saudi
Arabia in U.S. policy, or the
different Iraqi political forces, Perilous Power offers many
useful insights. And the exchange on short-term solutions for
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict should prove particularly
provocative.

(2)
Can you tell ZNet something about writing the book? Where does
the content come from? What went into making the book what it
is?

Noam and Gilbert decided from the outset that
it would be useful to have a third person present to moderate
their face-to-face conversation, and I was invited to serve in
this role. This project was to be a two-way conversation, but
where a third party would pose the questions, keep the
discussion on track, and take care of the technical process of
recording, enabling the two discussants to concentrate on
their analyses and arguments. As much as possible, I tried to
keep out of the conversation, just moving it along as
necessary.
The procedure we followed involved several
steps. We began by developing a list of questions to be
addressed. The three of us got together in Noam's office at
MIT in Cambridge, Massachusetts, for three
days of conversation in early January 2006. The recordings
were transcribed and I prepared a rough edit, eliminating
redundancy and tangents, reordering some of the sections, and
improving readability. Then Gilbert and Noam each went through
and edited their remarks. The goal here was not to produce a
faithful verbatim transcript of the conversation. Rather the
idea was to allow each of them to clarify or expand on their
remarks (though not to change a major argument to which the
other had already responded). We took the view that oral
comments made without access to sources should not serve as
the last word. So we verified facts and checked and filled in
quotations as necessary. And, because we believe that readers
should not be expected to take what authors say on faith, we
felt it important to add in documentation for all non-obvious
or controversial claims. In the Summer of 2006, each of the
authors wrote an Epilogue in which they commented on more
recent developments.

(3)
What are your hopes for Perilous Power? What do you hope it
will contribute or achieve, politically? Given the effort and
aspirations you have for the book, what will you deem to be a
success? What would leave you happy about the whole
undertaking? What would leave you
wond
ering if it was worth all the time and effort?

A
fundamental change in United
States policy toward the Middle East would make us more than
happy. But the effort will have been worthwhile if it helps to
make the average person in the West and especially the United
States more informed about and uncomfortable with current U.S.
policies in the Middle East and if it helps critics sharpen
their analysis and understanding. Too often critics discuss
Iraq as if the
categories "collaborator" and "resistance" are sufficient to
make sense of what is going on. Or that U.S. policy in the Middle East
can be fully explained by reference to the Israel lobby. Or
that Islamic fundamentalism must either be accepted as a
justification for Washington's imperial
foreign policy or dismissed as a figment of the Bush
administration's imagination. With a fuller appreciation of
the Middle East situation, critics should be better able to
oppose U.S. policy and
work for a more just and peaceful world.

[You can purchase the
book at a 15% individual customer discount at http://www.paradigmpublishers.com/Books/BookDetail.aspx?productID=143446

Excerpt:

Other
Major Powers and Iraq

Shalom:
Back in February 2003, when prowar forces in the United States
were pouring out all their French wine and renaming French
fries because France wasn't cooperating in the Security
Council, a lot of people in the antiwar movement were sort of
cheering on France and Germany and Russia, and other
governments that opposed the war. How reliable are these
governments in their antiwar stances?

Chomsky:
Their reliability is approximately zero. Sensible antiwar
activists don't ally themselves with governments. There was
something important about their position -- namely, there was
a reason why they were being so bitterly denounced by
U.S. elites: They
were meeting minimal conditions of democracy. For whatever
reason -- pure cynicism, in fact -- they were acting the way a
democratic government is supposed to act. In short, they were
responding to the will of the overwhelming majority of their
populations. The position of the antiwar movement should have
been that it's fine that these governments are paying
attention to their populations, whatever their reasons may be,
but we certainly don't ally with them, or have any trust in
them. What happened here was quite intriguing, but was
basically ignored. I can't recall any display of hatred and
contempt for democracy as extreme as what took place in those
months in the United States,
pretty much across the spectrum. There was what Rumsfeld
called "Old Europe" and "New Europe." Under his definition,
they are distinguished by a very sharp criterion: Old Europe
consists of the countries where the governments took the same
position as that of a large majority of the population; New
Europe -- the "hope for democracy" -- is the governments that
disregard an even larger percentage of the population. Some of
it was almost comical, like Italian prime minister Silvio
Berlusconi being invited to the White House as the
representative of the hope for democracy. You don't know
whether to laugh or cry. But the worst case was José María
Aznar, the Spanish prime minister. He was so lauded by Bush
and by British prime minister Tony Blair as the hope for
democracy that he was brought to their summit in the
Azores, where they basically
declared the war a couple of days before the invasion. Aznar
joined in this war declaration right after polls in
Spain
showed that the war had the support of 2 percent of the
population, so therefore he's the great hope for democracy.[1]
He was willing to follow orders from Crawford, Texas, with 2 percent of the
population supporting him. What does that tell you about the
attitudes toward democracy?

Some of it became
surreal. When the Turkish government, to everyone's surprise,
including mine, went along with the opinion of 95 percent of
its population and refused to allow a U.S. offensive through
Turkey, the Turkish
government was bitterly condemned for lacking democratic
credentials --  that was the phrase that was used --
because it went along with the opinion of 95 percent of the
public. That great dove, Secretary of State Colin Powell,
immediately announced we're going to have to have sanctions
against Turkey.[2] Most extreme was former undersecretary of
defense Paul Wolfowitz. He is the person identified in the
United States and, as far as I know, the European media as the
leading force in democracy promotion --  the "idealist in
chief," as he was called in the Washington Post.[3] He berated
the Turkish military for not intervening to compel the
government to overrule 95 percent of the population; he
basically ordered them to apologize to the United States, and
to say, "Let's figure out how we can be as helpful as possible
to the Americans."[4] And this was supposed to be democracy.
And this farce went on, without comment. The fact that anyone
can talk about democracy promotion, after this display, is
astounding.

This is what the antiwar
movement should be emphasizing. And if there are a couple of
governments that for their own cynical reasons happen to agree
with the majority of the population and take the right
position, fine, but that's the end of it; there's nothing more
to say about them. Tomorrow they'll do the opposite, because
they're acting out of pure cynicism -- power interests --
anyway.

Achcar: Noam's quite right to stress the
importance of this feature of our times. There's a general
trend at the level of the mainstream media to praise those
ruling politicians who rule without considering the polls;
that is deemed a great virtue. But behind it is the very
elitist idea, also embedded in the very concept of
"representative democracy," that, once elected, a
representative is free to do whatever he or she wants, even
against the unanimous will of his or her constituency. But I
must also say that in the case of the three governments that
we've mentioned -- France, Germany, and
Russia -- it was
certainly not out of any consideration for democracy that they
were against the war. I don't need to elaborate on the Russian
government. But even the French and German governments do not
hesitate to pursue the most unpopular neoliberal policies and
assaults on social gains. On the issue of Iraq, their
motivation was definitely not any democratic principle: There
were much more down-to-earth considerations at
stake.

Iraq is a country where there
was a direct clash of interests, in a very primary economic
sense, between the United
States and Britain, on the one hand, and
France and
Russia --
one could add China -- on the
other hand. The Soviet Union and France were the
main partners of Saddam Hussein for many years, providing him
with arms. France, especially, was his
main military backer in the war against Iran. And despite
Russian collusion and French participation in the 1991 war on
Iraq,
Saddam Hussein tried to play his traditional partnership with
France and
Russia,
during the UN embargo years, as a counterweight to the
United
States and Britain in the
Security Council. French and Russian companies were granted
important oil concessions that were conditioned on lifting the
embargo. That is why at some point Paris and Moscow changed their attitude, trying to
find ways to lift the embargo, and were blocked on that by
Washington and London.
The United States and British refusal to lift the embargo --
that is, to allow the lifting of the embargo if and when UN
inspectors determined that Iraq had disarmed -- was rightly
perceived by Paris and Moscow as a refusal to permit them to
take advantage of the oil concessions they had been granted.
And they very much saw the dedication of Washington and London to invade Iraq as a desire to
snatch the prize from them. Actually one of the first
proclamations after the invasion was that all contracts
granted by Saddam Hussein were to be considered null and void.
So that's the main reason why Paris and Moscow opposed that war. Had
the Bush administration offered them a substantial slice of
the cake, I'm sure they would have joined in. But the Bush
administration was so arrogant that it didn't want to grant
them much of anything, and that's why they kept opposing the
war to the end.

In the German case, there
were no direct economic interests at stake. At best, if one
were generous with German chancellor Gerhard Schröder, one
could grant him some concern over superior geopolitical
considerations --  for example, to say that he had some
concerns about the fact that the United States should not have
all the levers over Europe -- and one could link that also to
the very close relationship he had nurtured with Putin, and
the deals being worked out for a new gas pipeline going from
Russia to Germany through the Baltic Sea. But that would be a
generous assessment of Schröder's motivation. If one wanted to
be less generous, one would just stress that there's a big
dose, not of democracy but of opportunist electoralism, behind
his stance, because the preparation for the invasion of Iraq
happened at a time when the German chancellor was projected as
the loser in the forthcoming parliamentary elections, because
of his neoliberal social program, which caused the traditional
constituency of social democracy to be reluctant to support
him; and therefore, the only popular issue he could find was
opposition to the war, at a time when, indeed, the polls were
showing that the overwhelming majority of German public
opinion was opposed to the war.

Rulers like
Chirac, Putin, or Schröder should definitely not be regarded
as allies by the antiwar movement, especially since they are
themselves hawkish warmongers when their interests are at
stake. Russian forces are waging a terrible quasi-genocidal
war in Chechnya. The
French government still considers itself a colonial power in
Africa, and behaves as such.
Not to mention the fact that both France and Germany are involved in
Afghanistan, along with the
U.S. troops. To
that we should add that although Paris and Berlin did not
support the invasion of Iraq politically, technically speaking
they did everything they could to facilitate it: the Germans,
of course, by letting the whole U.S. military infrastructure
on their territory be used for that purpose,[5] the French by
opening their airspace to U.S. warplanes. So we should not be
fooled by such governments. The antiwar movement, at least its
most dynamic sectors, is closely linked with the global
justice movement, and I believe that's a very good combination
because these are two facets of the same reality: opposition
to imperial wars and to neoliberalism.

Chomsky: I
could add an analogous comment about U.S. attitudes. I
don't think it's just arrogance; the United States has a real
interest in undermining France and Germany, because they are the
industrial, commercial, and financial center of Europe. The rest is a kind of periphery.
The United
States has had a deep concern back
through the 1940s that Europe
might strike out on an independent path. That's one of the
reasons they were so concerned about French president Charles
de Gaulle, with his call for a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. And the forces
that might impel Europe that
way today are "Old Europe." That's one of the reasons the
United
States was so much in favor
of expanding the European Union (EU) to include the former
Soviet satellites, which it plausibly assumes it can control.
And it's one of the reasons also why U.S. policymakers are so
supportive of getting Turkey into the EU -- not
because they love Turkey, but because that's
another way of diluting the influence of the powerful sectors
in Europe and ensuring, they hope, that Europe will remain
under U.S. control.
Whatever position Germany and France had taken on the
Iraq war, that
would remain constant.

It's also what happened
in 1990 when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev agreed to allow
Germany to be
unified, which from the Russian point of view was an enormous
threat. Unlike the United
States, Russia has real
security concerns. Germany alone practically
destroyed Russia twice in the
first half of the twentieth century. For a unified
Germany to be
incorporated into a Western military alliance was a tremendous
threat. So Gorbachev agreed to German unification, but on one
condition: that he get a firm pledge from Bush Sr. that NATO
would not expand to the east. Within a couple of years,
however, Clinton just reneged
on the commitment, and expanded NATO to the east, right to the
borders of Russia.
Russia responded,
as you'd expect, by beginning to increase its offensive
military capacity. Russia had been pressing very
hard for the elimination of nuclear weapons, and it had
declared -- as the United States and
NATO had not -- that it would not be the first to use nuclear
weapons. After Clinton's
backing down on the NATO pledge, Russia backed down
on its moves and moved toward a more militaristic, offensive
posture, extended more under Bush Jr. These are really
important developments that are part of the background of the
hysteria about Old Europe and New Europe. New Europe is
important for the United States as a
way of undermining European independence.

Achcar:
I quite agree. But we should also stress the fact that in New
Europe public opinion was overwhelmingly against the war, even
more so than in Old Europe!

Chomsky: The only
place prowar sentiment reached 10 percent was
Romania.[6]

Achcar: So it was in New Europe that
governments most disdained the opinions of their own
populations.

Chomsky: But they are obedient to the
United
States when they dilute
European independence.

Notes

1.
Agence France Presse, "Majority of
Spanish Against War on Iraq," February 22,
2003. According to this article, 2.3 percent supported a war
waged by the United States and
its allies without UN authorization (the actual war that was
waged), 11.8 percent opposed war unless there was UN
authorization, and 84.7 percent opposed war in all
circumstances.
2. Richard Boudreaux and John Hendren,
"U.S. Drops
Its Bid to Base Troops in Turkey," Los
Angeles Times, March 15, 2003, p.
A5.
3. David Ignatius, "A War of Choice, and One Who Chose
It," Washington Post, November 2,
2003, p. B1.
4. Mark Lacey, "Turkey Rejects Criticism by
U.S.
Official over Iraq," New York
Times, May 8, 2003, p. A15. Wolfowitz said: "Let's have a
Turkey that steps
up and says: 'We made a mistake. We should have known how bad
things were in Iraq, but we know
now. Let's figure out how we can be as helpful as possible to
the Americans.'" Wolfowitz "singled out the Turkish military
for criticism. 'I think for whatever reason, they did not play
the strong leadership role that we would have expected.'" For
Turkish poll data, see Philip P. Pan, "Turkey Plans for
62,000 U.S. Troops," Washington Post, February 26, 2003, p.
A17.
5. This is apart from the allegations that German
intelligence helped the American military during its invasion.
See, for example, Richard Bernstein, "2 German Roles: Opposing
War and Aiding U.S.," New York
Times, March 3, 2006, p. A12.
6. See Gallup
International, Iraq Poll, conducted 2003, available online at
http://www.gallup-international.com/ContentFiles/survey.asp?id=10.

[Excerpted
from Perilous Power: The Middle East and U.S. Foreign Policy,
by Noam Chomsky & Gilbert Achcar, edited with a Preface by
Stephen R. Shalom, published by Paradigm Publishers, pp.
90-95. To purchase the book at a 15% individual customer
discount, go to http://www.paradigmpublishers.com/Books/BookDetail.aspx?productID=143446.]

الاخوة
اعضاء اللجنة التنفيذية لمنظمة التحرير

بيانكم
حول مؤتمر الجاليات في اوروبا، موقف غير مسؤول

فوجئت
كغيري من الفلسطينيين المغتربين ببيان اللجنة التنفيذية لمنظمة
التحرير وكذا رسالة الدكتور رفيق الحسيني مدير ديوان الرئاسة الى
السفراء المعتمدين تتنصل من حق الاوروبيين الفلسطينيين في عقد
مؤتمر لهم يتمسك بمنظمة التحرير ممتلا شرعيا وحيدا للشعب
الفلسطيني وبالثوابت تقرير المصير والدولة المستقلة وعاصمتها
القدس والحل العادل لقضية اللاجئين.  وكان الحسيني قد خاطب
اللجنة التحضيرية لمؤتمر الشتات قبل عام بالمباركة والتأييد
واعتذار الرئيس عن الحضور لانشغاله .

ان
خطورة هذا الخطاب تكمن في:

1-
عندما يشير بيان التنفيذية في 5 مايو الى التشكيك بتمويل
المؤتمر، فانه يضع الاوروبي الفلسطيني في موقع الشبهة الامنية في
بلده حيث يخضع للقانون، والحقيقة غير ذلك تماما لأن المندوبين
يشاركون على حسابهم الخاص.

2-
لقد جرى الاتصال بالدائرة السياسية حسب الاصول لدعوتها لتكون
المظلة الوطنية للمؤتمر، ولا نعتقد ان في ذلك جريمة لان احدا في
الشتات لم يبلغ بان الدائرة السياسية لم تعد ذات
صلة.

3-
بهذا التشكيك والعبث انتم تدفعون بالاوروبيين الفلسطينيين الى
اليأس والتخلي عن ممثلهم الشرعي الذي يتمسكون به، فالجيل الرابع
والثالث من الفلسطينيين في هذه القارة لا يعرفون من فلسطين سوى
كوفيةعرفات.

4-هناك
مشكلة في انشقاق الجاليات بسبب اضعاف وتهميش المنظمة، فالتيار
الاسلامي عقد قبل ايام مؤتمرا لانصاره في هولندا وشفيق الحوت
وسليمان ابوستة يحضران في بيروت لمؤتمر المستقلين الوطنيين،
والوطنيون يحضرون لبرشلونه في الخامس والعشرين من الشهر الجاري،
هذا يدل على وجود ازمة حقيقية لا تعالج بالبيانات وادخال الناس
في مشاكل ومناكفات حركية لا دخل للاوروبي الفلسطيني
بها.

ان
هموم قرابة نصف مليون فلسطيني في القارة الاوروبية هي
الاساس وهي  التي تدفعه الى البحث عن اطر جماعية تتصل
بوجوده وجوهر حياته مثل مشاكل الاقامة والعمل والاندماج
وتعليم اللغة العربية لابنائه والتمييز العنصري ، فهي
الناظم لسلوكه كاقلية عرقية ثقافية،

اما
الدافع الاخر الذي يدفع الى التفكير بخلق اطر جماعية فيتصل بما
وصل اليه التمثيل الفلسطيني في اوروبا الذي يختصر اليوم
باليافطات الدينية والمذهبية بعناوين  بنغالية
وباكستانية وتركية. ولهذا نقدر ان مصدري البيانات لم ياخذوا
بالاعتبار  ان الجاليات والعمل الوطني في اوروبا ضعف وتلاشى
أثره منذ مطلع التسعينات، وما تداعي الناس لعقد اكثر من مؤتمر
سوى مؤشر لحراك سياسي،  بل ودليل عافية ورغبة في
المساهمة في الجهود الجارية للخروج من الازمة وحالة الاستقطاب
الثنائي التي اضرت بالقضية الوطنية  وتهدد
فعليا مستقبل الشعب الفلسطيني، وتصرفكم اللامسؤول هذا يؤكد
انكم لا زلتم بعقلية الستينات وتحسبون ان الجاليات هي فصيل او
كتيبة تابعة لكم، يمكن تحريكها حسب المزاج والتشهير بها والتشكيك
بوطنيتها وقت الخلاف، لا بل ويدلل سلوككم على
تجاهل التغييرات التي وقعت في الواقع الفلسطيني بكل
تعبيراته السياسية والثقافية، تغيير حقيقي ينبغي التعاطي معه
بمسؤولية عالية وبابداع ايضا..

محمد
مشارقة – الجالية الفلسطينية في المملكة المتحدة

10 May 2007

ملف العناوين التالية

مسيرات
احتجاجية تستقبله في عمان

رفض
شعبي اردني واسع لزيارة "المجرم" بوش

فوز
المجالي برئاسة مجلس النواب الأردني بأقل من
الثلثين

الملك
عبدالله: الإنتخابات النيابية على رأس الإستحقاقات
الدستورية

شن
هجوما عنيفا عليها مصرا على منصبه

أحزاب المعارضة الأردنية
تخير العوران بينها وبين  الوزارة

قوات
بدر تلقت تعليمات بالإستعداد لدخول الأراضي الفلسطينية

أرفض
استقالة الأمين العام مقابل استعادة أموال جمعية المركز
الإسلامي

أحمد الزرقان "للوطن": بني
ارشيد الأكثر

استهدافا..
الحزب أصبح أكثر فعالية في عهده

رئيس
الديوان الملكي يمثل الملك في تشييع المراقب العام الأسبق لإخوان
الأردن

أبو فارس يدعو في مئوية
البنا لتغيير الأنظمة بالقوة وأبو الفتوح يرفض

لتسهيل
اشتراك المغتربين وحصولهم على رواتب تقاعدية

مكتب
متنقل ومتكامل للضمان الإجتماعي الأردني يزور دول
الإغتراب

ـ
72 مليون دينار فائض العام الماضي وأربعة بلايين دينار قيمة
المحفظة الإستثمارية للمؤسسة

ـ
اتجاه لفتح باب الإشتراك أمام السواقين والمزارعين ووضع سقف أعلى
للراتب التقاعدي

اعدام
خفض لعشر سنوات حبس لإثنين خططا لضرب اسرائيل

"اطالة
لسان" توجه للمتهم الكربولي بقتل سائق اردني

الحكومة
الأردنية ترفع يدها عن أموال الإسلاميين إذا استقال بني
ارشيد

العوران يؤكد تلقيه تشجيع
والأحزاب تستغرب وترفض

بقاء
وزير اردني في تنسيقية أحزاب المعارضة يبحث
الأحد

تحت
ضغط رفض فصائل دمشق

الغاء
عقد "المركزي" لانتخاب عباس رئيسا لدولة
فلسطين

الموافقة
تسمح له المشاركة بدورة مجلس النواب الثلاثاء

أبو
السكر يطلب اعادة محاكمته عن "زيارة التعزية"
بالزرقاوي

حكومة
وحدة وطنية أو كفاءات لتصريف الأمور

كوادر
فلسطينية تطالب بتشكيل مجلس وطني جديد ينتخب "تنفيذية"
جديدة

أبو
السكر يسأل أمين عام مجلس النواب الأردني عن

السند القانوني لاعتباره
فاقدا لعضويته في المجلس

الأرقام
تؤكد صعوبة عزلهم

الإسلاميون
يتأهلون للفوز بعضوية اللجان البرلمانية في الأردن

29/11/2006

عمان
ـ "الوطن":

تتوقع مصادر برلمانية اردنية حصول كتلة نواب الحركة
الإسلامية على مقاعد معقولة في لجان مجلس النواب، بعد أن أخفقت
في الوصول إلى موقع أحد مساعدي رئيس المجلس.

هذه
التوقعات مبنية على الرقم الذي حصل عليه موسى الوحش مرشح الكتلة
لموقع مساعد الرئيس، وإخفاق إثنين من مرشحي تحالف عبد الهادي
المجالي في الوصول إلى موقعي النائب الثاني، ومساعد رئيس
المجلس.

الإجماع
داخل الكتل السبع التي تشكل منها التحالف انصب فقط على شخص
المجالي الذي، الذي حصل على أقل من ثلثي أصوات النواب بصوت واحد،
أي 73 صوتا، في حين فاز الدكتور نايف الفايز بموقع النائب الول
للرئيس بالتزكية. لكن هذا التحالف انخفض إلى 40 صوتا صبت لصالح
المهندس عاطف الطراونة/ مرشح التحالف لموقع النائب الثاني
للرئيس، فخسر لصالح الدكتورة فلك الجمعاني، التي حصلت على 60
صوتا، وهي تنتمي ليس فقط لذات التحالف، وإنما لذات الكتلة
(التجمع الديمقراطي)..!

وبذا،
فقد فازت امرأة ثانية بعضوية المكتب الدائم للمجلس، بدلا من
امرأة واحدة، حيث كان مقررا فوز المحامية ناريمان الروسان بموقع
أحد مساعدي الرئيس عن تحالف المجالي، وقد فازت فعلا بـ 49
صوتا.

الإختراق
الثاني لقائمة التحالف تمثل في فوز النائب فواز الزعبي بموقع
مساعد الرئيس بخمسين صوتا، فيما خسر النائب عرب الصمادي (تحالف
المجالي) بـ 43 صوتا، وموسى الوحش (الكتلة الإسلامية) بـ 46
صوتا.

وبذا،
يكون الإسلاميون قد حصلوا على 32 صوتا، اضافة إلى اصوات نوابهم
الـ 14 الذين حضروا الجلسة، حيث غيب النائبان على أبو السكر،
ومحمد أبو فارس، لعدم تلقيهما دعوة لحضور دورة المجلس، في حين
تغيب النائب ابراهيم المشوخي (اسلامي) ، الذي سبق للمدعي العام
في محكمة أمن الدولة أن قرر منع محاكمته في ذات القضية التي حكم
بها أو السكر وأبو فارس بالحبس لمدة سنة وشهر.

الرقم
الذي حصل عليه زهير أبو الراغب (26 صوتا) في المنافسة على موقع
رئيس المجلس، والرقم الذي حصل عليه الوحش، يؤكدان وجود امكانية
لتمثيل الكتلة الإسلامية بشكل مريح في اللجان البرلمانية لدى
تشكيلها بالإنتخاب في جلسة مقبلة، وعلى نحو يحول دون عزلها.

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